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ABSRACT 
Empirical studies having addressed the issue of free-will suffer from controversial methodologies and 
data interpretation. We present a new paradigm involving a synchronization task where the time 
interval to synchronize with is randomly within and without subject’s synchronization capabilities and 
ask subjects to retrospectively evaluate (Q1) which of the two occurred or (Q2) whether their motor 
response had had been reactive/speeded or delayed. Contrary to the non-FW view according to 
which our judgments on the cause of our actions are corrupted by these actions’ outcome (here an 
early or delayed motor response), Q1-judgments correlate with the actual duration of the 
synchronization interval rather than with subjects’ motor response latencies. Instead of postidictively 
reshuffling their judgment to make it match the outcome of their actions, subjects preserve the 
causal chain of events having entailed them. When answering Q2 subjects’ judgments also correlate 
with the synchronization interval, proof that they cannot decide on the intentionality of their actions. 
Hence the present results reveal the intrinsic duality of the free-will concept. 
  
Most, if not all humans have the experience of ‘free will’ (FW). FW and its corollaries (volition, 
intentionality), just like consciousness (a poorly defined concept), are strictly private matters: their 
existence can be asserted by the subject and by no one else. Hence empirical measurements of any 
FW-related phenomena (such as brain events) must be validated by subject’s contention that he 
experienced FW indeed. 
The standard contemporary anti-FW allegation of both philosophers and experimenters1-4 is that FW 
is but an ‘illusion’ instantiated by subject’s unconscious, postidictive and non-causal interpretation of 
the chain of events having entailed his action. It is non-causal in that the cause of one’s action is 
judged in the light of this action’s outcome rather than for what it actually was. This is not to say that 
subjects consciously give up with the causal interpretation of the physical chain of events, namely 
Stimulus (exogeneous or endogeneous) → Decision/Intention → Response (action), but that while 
consciously sticking with reality, this interpretation is in fact unconsciously based on the non-causal 
chain S → R → D/I. Most of the empirical approaches to the FW illusion capitalized on the relative 
timing of D and R to show that the experienced timing of D trails the timing of R as assessed by the 
neural activity precursory to action5-7. In addition to debatable definitions of what is meant by 
volition, intention, etc.8, strong qualms have been expressed both about subject’s capability of 
assessing  the moment of his decision to act while acting and about the techniques used to allow 
such assessments9,10.  
Here we capitalize on subject’s motor response to (i.e. synchronization with) a temporal interval 
(stimulus) and of his a posteriori judgment of that interval to find out whether the latter relates to 
the interval/stimulus itself (causal/objective judgment), or rather to the motor response that this 
stimulus has prompted (non-causal/postdictive case). As described below, S is manipulated so as to 
entail speeded (‘reactive’) or delayed (‘intentional’) motor responses on a random basis. The causal 
alternative would give leeway to the possibility that introspective claims of FW are realistic. The non-
causal one would raise doubts as to subject’s capability of objectively judging, in line with the illusory 
FW stand. 
The operationalization of the question asked draws on a motor synchronization task and on the 
underlying process of deciding to react or to delay one’s motor response depending on whether a 
randomly drawn temporal interval that a subject must synchronize with (hereafter synchronization 
interval, SI) is shorter or longer than this participant’s Reaction Time (RT). Once the participant has 
acted his motor response with a given Response Time (RsT), he is asked to provide a binary (Yes/No) 
response to one of the following three questions: 
Q1: Has the current SI been long enough for him to synchronize with? 
Q2: Has he reacted or waited to achieve synchronization? 
Q3: Has the current SI been short or long? 
The first two questions were meant to encourage subject’s reliance on introspection (note this well, 
these questions do not bear on whether the RsT had or had not been synchronized). Nonetheless, 
subjects may base their judgment on the actual SI – an objective, causal judgment. Alternatively, 
their response may be contingent on their RsT – a subjective, non-causal judgment –, or possibly on 
the SI-RsT difference – a judgment combining objective and subjective information. A purely non-
causal judgment subtending subject’s answer to any of the first two questions would rely on an 
implicit appraisal of his own RT, a capacity known to exist11,12. Answering Q3 should not require an 
appeal to introspection; instead subjects should only appraise the mean of the SI distribution 
(implicit ‘standard’) and compare it to the current SI, yet another capacity known to exist and to yield 
accuracies equivalent to those obtained in the presence of the standard12,13.  
Clearly, very short (i.e. <<RT) and very long (i.e. >>RT) SIs will entail 100% reliable responses to Qs 1 
and 2 as such durations will most obviously be respectively beyond and within subject’s 
synchronization capacities independently of this subject’s actual synchronization RsT, or even in the 
absence of any motor synchronization response. Q3 will also entail 100% reliable responses for SIs 
remote from the mean of the SI distribution. Instead, if the SIs are limited to a narrow time range 
about the reaction/proaction transition point (presumably close to participant’s RT), they will entail 
much less reliable answers to any of the three questions above. This opens the possibility that 
participants will appeal to their introspectively estimated RsT as an alternative source of information 
(even though less reliable than a ‘direct’ SI estimation12). 
An additional advantage of using a relatively narrow SI range about each participant’s RT is that it 
should dilute the correlation between SI and RsT, a necessary condition for disentangling (at least 
partly) participant’s reliance on SI from that on RsT. Reliance on RsT should be even more 
pronounced if the temporal gap between SI and RsT is directly assessable by the subject via a sensory 
(here visual) feedback. Under such conditions, observers are capable of judging their synchronization 
response (i.e. whether it had been early or delayed) with an accuracy of less than ±50ms, more than 
twice better than their perceptual estimation of the SI they had to synchronize with12. 
In short, the present experiments are designed to test whether subjects’ judgments of the cause of 
their action relies, as it should, on this cause itself or rather on its consequence. This test is 
performed under conditions that maximize the decorrelation between the timing of their motor 
responses and the external stimulus that prompted it, on the one hand, and the information 
expected to enhance subjects’ reliance on their response to this external stimulus rather than on the 
stimulus itself, on the other hand. Finding that, despite the availability of such information, subjects’ 
judgments hinge on the timing of this stimulus rather than on the action it entailed would plead 
against the non-causality upon which the illusion of FW is seemingly built. In the same time, basing 
one’s response to Q3 (that bears on subject’s reactive vs. delayed motor response) on the physical 
interval having caused his action would support the notion that subjects are not aware of their motor 
decisions, a stance favoring the FW illusion. 
 
RESULTS 
The median and mean RTs assessed with the blocked filled gauge (227.4 ± 15.9ms and 
230.6 ± 13.1ms; Preliminary 1) and with the randomized filling in durations (230.4 ± 8ms and 
242.6 ± 12.1; Preliminary 2) were not statistically different. 
Figure 2a presents mean RsTs for each participant (different symbols; keep in mind that RT and RsT 
refer to response times measured in speeded and in a synchronization response mode, respectively) 
as a function of SI in Exp. 1. This representation is not quite legitimate as at least three of the seven 
RsT means per subject were derived from bimodal RsT distributions (as assessed by Akaike 
Information Criterion, AIC14), with all subjects showing bimodal RsT distributions for SI = 0 and for 
SI = 500ms. These bimodal RsT distributions for the two extreme SIs are exemplified in Fig. 2a1 and 
2a2 for a typical subject, SL). Averaging RsTs over such bimodal distributions accounts for subjects’ 
too early synchronization responses (i.e. RsTs below the main dashed diagonal) for the longest two 
SIs (400 and 500ms; for such SIs, subjects show perfect synchronization under blocked SI 
conditions12). While the source of this bimodality is of critical interest in understanding the 
synchronization process (an issue addressed in an ongoing study), it is of little relevance for the 
presently asked question. It is worth noting however that the means of the fastest RsT distributions 
averaged over the 5 subjects for SI = 0 (249 ± 29.8ms) is close to their mean RTs assessed in the two 
preliminary (RT) experiments (230.6 ± 13 and 242.6 ± 12.1ms) and not significantly different from 
them. This suggests that in mixed SI blocks including SIs too short to synchronize with, subjects’ 
behavior alternates in about equal proportions between reactive and delayed/intentional response 
modes. 
Fig. 2a3 displays the cumulative Gaussian (μ,σ) fitted to subject’s SL ‘Yes’ responses to Q1 (Neider-
Mead simplex algorithm) in Exp. 1. The means of such functions fitted to each subject’s ‘Yes’ 
responses are their PSSSI and have been used as midpoints of the 200ms SI range tested in Exp. 2 
(allowing a new, more accurate PSSSI measure). A first notable observation from Fig. 2 is that the 
PSSSI averaged over the 5 subjects in Exp. 1 (246.4 ± 34.2ms) are similar to these subjects’ mean RTs 
assessed in the preliminary experiments and closest to their mean RsTs derived from their fastest RsT 
distribution for SI = 0 (249.0 ± 29.8ms). This suggests that subjects have an accurate implicit 
knowledge of their mean RT and use it when answering Q1.  
The restricted SI range about each subject’s PSSSI used in Exp. 2 (in-between 117-183 to 317-383ms) 
ensured that subjects operated in an uncertainty reaction/reflection region and that their RsT were 
minimally correlated with SI (so as to maximize the disentanglement between subjects’ putative 
reliance, when answering any of the 3 questions, on SI from their reliance on RsT and, as a 
consequence, on SI-RST). That this was achieved is demonstrated by the very shallow slopes (0.06-
0.3; r ∈ [.11-.48]) of the mean RsT vs. SI functions displayed for each subject in Fig. 2b (same symbols 
as in Fig. 2a). 
Fig. 3 shows the percentages of ‘Yes’ responses of the same representative subject as in Fig. 2a1-3 
for each of the three questions asked (circles, squares and triangles for Q1, Q2 and Q3) together with 
the corresponding cumulative Gaussian fits as a function of SI (3a), RsT (3b) and SI-RsT (3c). Whatever 
the question asked, the steepest sigmoids (smallest σ) are obtained when the ‘Yes’ responses are 
related to SI (σSI = 36.9 ± 1.7ms), slightly shallower when related to SI-RsT (σSI-RsT =43.1 ± 3.0ms) and 
flat for all practical reasons when related to RsT (σRsT = 235.8 ± 102.2ms). These observations are true 
for all subjects (with two marginal exceptions out of 15 comparisons for Q1, subjects MD and CR) as 
shown in Table 1. At a first look, the accuracy of subjects’ judgments appears to depend on the 
question asked (σQ1 = 170.9 ± 134.1; σQ2 = 68.3 ± 23.8; σQ3 = 76.7 ± 38.1 ms) but this is essentially 
due to the very inaccurate responses to Q1 when related to RsT (σRsT,Q1 = 439 ± 121.8 ms). A two-way 
ANOVA (factors question-type and relevant index, i.e. SI, RsT and SI-RsT) confirms these 
observations, namely a significant index effecti (F(2,8) = 13.8, p = .021) but no question-type effect 
(F= 5.3, p = .076). A partial comparison reveals a significantly steeper SI-related than (Si-RsT)-related 
slope (F(1,4) = 3.44, p = .02). Table 1 also displays the point-biserial correlations15 (rPB) between the 
binary (Yes/No) and the continuous (SI, RsT and SI-RsT) variables. As it should, the steepness of the 
fitted functions and rPB show a high negative correlation (r = -.62, p << .001). In short, the data clearly 
show that whether asked to provide an introspective (Q1) or ‘absolute’ (Q3) judgment of SI (Q1 and 
Q3) or of them having responded in a reactive or reflective/delayed mode (Q2), subjects base their 
responses on the actual duration of SI with practically no ‘postidictive’ interference from their motor 
synchronization response. Another way to put it is to say that subjects’ interpretation of the past is 
causal. 
Additional support for this conclusion transpires from a closer look at subjects’ Points of Subjective 
Synchronization (PSS) and RTs. As already noted, RTs were practically identical when directly 
measured in the preliminary RT experiments with the gauge instantaneously filled (SI=0) or filling 
over 0 to 500ms intervals or when derived from the fastest RsT distribution to the instantaneously 
filled gauge in the synchronization Exp. 1 (black circle, square and triangle in column “RT” of Figure 
4). To answer the introspective Qs 1 and 2, subjects must, in principle, refer their responses to their 
introspected RT. The fact that the PSSSI (column “PSS_SI” in Fig. 4) derived from their answers to 
these questions (Q1, solid red and open blue circles for Exps 1 and 2, respectively; Q2, open blue 
square, Exp. 2) are about equal to their RTs, while the corresponding PSSRsT (column “PSS_SI”; same 
colors and symbols) differ markedly from the RTs as well as across experiments (circle vs. square) and 
subjects (error bars) support the notion that subjects’ introspection was based on the SIs rather than 
on their own RsT. As the mean of the SIs used in Exp. 2 was by construction equal to the PSSSI 
obtained in Exp. 1 (red solid circle), the PSS derived from subjects’ responses to Q3 (that bore on the 
SI itself) should coincide with the mean SI. This is the case for the PSSSI but not for the PSSRsT implying 
once again that subjects have judged, as they should have for Q3, the SI and not their own RsT. 
Hence, subjects base their judgments on the objective duration of the interval they have to 
synchronize with whether in response to an introspective (Q1, Q2) or “objective” (Q3) question. 
Finally, the possibility that subjects calibrated their responses (whatever the question asked) 
relatively to their average RsT is not supported by the data as these averages (“AV_RsT” column in 
Fig. 4) are significantly above subjects’ RT and PSSSI. 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION 
The present experiments demonstrate that despite being given full feedback on their motor 
synchronization response with a random time interval, subjects’ introspective judgment of the length 
of this interval relative to their synchronization capacity (Q1) or of them having been in a reactive or 
reflective motor response mode (Q2) are poorely related, if at all, to their actual synchronization 
response time but strongly related to the physical duration of the interval. In fact, the accuracy of 
such introspective judgments is no different from that assessed when subjects are asked to judge the 
‘absolute’ duration of these same intervals (Q3). The statistical analysis also shows that the accuracy 
of subjects’ judgments is higher when these judgments are referred to the time interval itself rather 
than to the difference between this interval and the timing of their synchronization response. The 
data also show that subjects’ Point of Subjective Synchronization is not significantly different from 
their mean reaction time and less variable (over experiments and subjects) when derived from 
subjects’ answers (to any of the three questions asked) as a function of the actual duration of the 
synchronization interval than as a function of their synchronization response time. While it has been 
shown that judgements of a stimulus having entailed an action (such as a target and a saccade to it) 
are not biased by putative motor errors 16-18 at least in healthy subjects18, the present study is the 
first to show that introspection on one’s actions is based on these actions’ physical cause rather than 
on their outcome. In the same time, such introspection appears to be calibrated relatively to 
subjects’ introspected reaction time. The specific observation that responses to Q2, that bears on 
subjects’ past decision to react or to delay action, do not correlate with their actual response time 
implies that, at least in the present experimental conditions, subjects do not have conscious access to 
or, alternatively, do not remember what this decision has been. This observation raises serious 
doubts about the experimental paradigm used in many studies where subjects were asked to specify 
when their decision to act had been taken5,9,10. 
Despite their fuzzy definition8, reactive and intentional movements are known to reflect19-22 and 
actually be triggered by23 the activity of distinct neural networks. Yet, such anatomo-physiological 
distinction does not appear to sustain subjects’ introspective judgments, specifically their knowledge 
of having reacted or delayed their action (Q2). This is so even though, in contrast with previous 
laboratory manipulations of volition (of the kind “Have free will now!” – see Haggard7), subjects’ 
switch from a reactive to an intentional response mode was entirely under their own control. The 
conundrum appears to be solved, though not conceptually, by Desmurget et al.’s 23 astonishing 
findings that stimulation of distinct cortices may trigger the ‘intention and desire’ to move a limb or 
the lips together with the feeling of having done so in the absence of any corresponding 
electromyographic activity (inferior parietal regions) and reciprocally, an overt movement without 
the ‘feeling’ of having executed it (premotor area). Inasmuch as the ‘consciousnesses’ of acting and 
the action itself appear to be dissociated (or at least dissociable), it is not more remarkable to admit 
that reactive and intentional actions might not be consciously dissociable either. Such dissociations 
are actually amply documented in amputees and anosognostic patients (for the first type of 
dissociation) and in patients with utilization behavior or with delusions of control (for the second 
type of dissociation)24. Temptingly, one would take such intention/action dissociations as evidence 
favoring the notion that free will is but an illusion3. The present results provide paradoxical 
denotations in this respect. On the one hand, subjects’ incapacity of retrospectively classifying their 
reactive vs. delayed motor response (Q2) based on the actual latency of this response comforts the 
view of an illusory free will. On the other hand, the fact that subjects judge their capacity of 
synchronizing a motor response with a random time interval based on their estimation of this 
interval rather than on their introspected response time (Q1) implies that their retrospective 
evaluation of the chain of events having caused their actions is causal, a prerequisite of the free will 
stand. Hence, not astonishingly, the present experiments and results reveal the intrinsic duality of 
the free will concept debated since the antiquity25,26 and most recently formulated mathematically27. 
  
FIGURE LEGENDS 
Figure 1. Spatial (a) and temporal (b) display of the stimulus. Note the different ranges of the Synchronization 
Intervals used and h different questions asked in Exps 1 and 2. 
Figure 2. Synchronization Response Times (RsT) as a function of SI in Experiments 1 (a) and 2 (b) of all 5 
participants (different symbols) together with representative bimodal RsT distributions of participant SL for 
SI = 0 (a1) and SI = 500ms (a2) as well as a representative cumulative Gaussian fitted to this subject’s ‘Yes’ 
responses to Q1 as a function of SI (a3). The dashed main diagonals in a and b show perfectly synchronized 
RsTs. The double arrowed right-angle lines in a3 point to this subject’s RsT at 50% ‘Yes’ responses (i.e. the 
mean of the fitted Gaussian) which is referred to as his Point of Subjective Synchronization referred to SI 
(PSSSI). 
Figure 3. Percentage of ‘Yes’ responses to Qs1-3 (circles, squares and triangles, respectively) of a 
representative subject (SL) as a function of SI (a), RsT (b) and SI-RsT (c) together with the best cumulative 
Gaussian fits (sigmoids of corresponding colors). Insets show the respective means and SDs of the fits. 
Figure 4. Reaction Times (RT; black symbols), Points of Subjective Synchronization derived from the cumulative 
Gaussian fits of the ‘Yes’ responses as a function of the Synchronization Interval (PSS_SI) and as a function of 
subjects’ synchronization response time (PSS_RsT) and the means of these RsT (Av_RsT) as measured or 
derived from the different experiments. RTs measured in response to the instantaneously filled (SI=0) gauge 
and to a gauge filling over 0 to 500ms intervals are shown as the black circle and square, respectively. RT 
derived from the fastest RsT distribution to the instantaneously filled gauge in the synchronization Exp. 1 is 
shown a the black triangle. PSS and Av_RsT derived from responses to questions 1, 2 and 3 are shown as 
circles, squares and triangles with their colors referring to the Experiment where they have been assessed (red, 
Exp. 1; blue, Exp. 2).  The solid red circle is the PSSSI from Exp. 1 used as the midpoint of the SI range tested in 
Exp. 2. Each symbol is the average over the 5 participants with the vertical bars showing 1SE. 
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 METHODS 
Stimulus 
It was a 1° thick virtual annulus (the ‘gauge’) with a 3° external edge radius (Figure 1a) that started to 
fill in (randomly at one out of 8 locations marked by a radial bar) either in white (100 cd/m²) or in 
black (0.05 cd/m²) on a 50 cd/m² grey background. Polarity was swapped on each trial to prevent 
adaptation effects. The filling gauge was displayed on a 19’’ E96f+SB ViewSonic screen (1024x768 
pixels, 100 Hz refresh rate) 40 cm away from observers’ eyes. The filling in was always 
counterclockwise (Fig. 1b) and occurred randomly within one out of 7 (0, 100, 200, 250, 300, 400, 
500 ms; Experiment 1), or out of 21 synchronization time intervals (SIs, 10 ms apart within a range of 
200 ms centered about each observer’s Point of Subjective Synchronization; Experiment 2; see 
Procedure). Stimulus presentation and response recording were controlled using the 
Psychtoolbox28,29. 
 
Procedure 
The experiment was performed in three stages. In a preliminary stage participants were asked to 
react (press a keyboard) as soon as possible to the appearance of the annular gauge that was either 
(a) fully filled from the start (SI = 0; one blocked session of 100 trials per subject; Preliminary 1) or (b) 
whose filling duration (hence speed) was randomly chosen across trials out of 7 possible SIs over a 
range of 0 to 500 ms (see above; Preliminary 2). In the latter case, 80 reaction times (RTs) were 
collected for each duration and observer in two sessions. The measure of these RTs was meant to be 
compared with subjects’ Points of Subjective Synchronization (PSS) derived from their binary 
responses in Experiments 1 and 2. In both these experiments participants were asked to synchronize 
their motor responses (key-presses) with the moment the filling of the gauge was completed. In Exp. 
1 this range was the same as in the second preliminary experiment (i.e. 7 SIs spanning 0 to 500ms). 
After each motor synchronization response subjects had to provide a Yes/No response to Q1, i.e. 
whether or not the SI had been long enough for them to synchronize their key-press with 
(independently of whether or not they believed having provided an accurate synchronization 
response). The mean of the cumulative Gaussian fit to the frequency of ‘Yes’ responses as a function 
of SI is referred to as participant’s PSSSI. The PSSSI corresponded to the mean of the SI range to be 
used in Exp. 2. There were 40 trials per SI and per session (i.e. 40x7 = 280 trials/session) repeated 
four times (i.e. 160 trials per SI total). At least 5 s breaks were imposed after every 20 trials. Exp. 2 
was run in three versions that differed only in the question asked after the synchronization key-press, 
i.e. Q1, 2 or 3. All versions consisted in repeating Exp. 1 but this time with 21 SIs 10 ms apart within a 
total range of 200 ms centered on each participant’s PSSSI. Q1 and Q2 were intended to bias subjects 
toward a subjective appraisal of the SIs relatively to their own (introspected) RT. Instead, Q3 was 
meant to bias subjects toward an objective appraisal of the SIs; to answer it subjects had to implicitly 
estimate the mean SI. 
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i All effects are corrected for sphericity – Greenhouse-Geisser. 




Table 1. Standard deviations of the cumulative Gaussians fitted to subjects' ’Yes' responses to each of the three Questions asked in Exp 2 as a function of the 
Synchronization Interval (sSI), Response Time (sRsT) and SI-RsT(sSI-RsT) (odd cols) together with the corresponding Point Biserial correlations (rPB; even 
cols).
Q1
Has the current SI been long enough for you to 
synchronize with?
Q2
Have you reacted or waited to achieve 
synchronization?
Q3
Has the current SI been short or long?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Sjs sSI rPB,SI sRsT rPB,RsT sSI-RsT rPB,SI-RsT sSI rPB,SI sRsT rPB,RsT sSI-RsT rPB,SI-RsT sSI rPB,SI sRsT rPB,RsT sSI-RsT rPB,SI-RsT
LG 37 0.76 154 0.18 39 0.68 47 0.70 60 0.42 56 0.55 32 0.77 53 0.45 39 0.64
SL 35 0.75 806 0.03 54 0.68 36 0.75 118 0.19 49 0.66 26 0.81 161 0.13 38 0.74
MD 32 0.78 229 0.07 32 0.76 35 0.76 66 0.21 41 0.71 41 0.74 114 0.17 45 0.69
CR 34 0.75 622 0.03 28 0.75 60 0.62 219 0.08 62 0.60 41 0.74 75 0.19 42 0.70
MG 36 0.77 384 0.07 41 0.71 44 0.67 218 0.11 53 0.60 38 0.74 361 0.07 44 0.69
m 34.8 0.76 439 0.08 38.8 0.72 44.4 0.70 136 0.20 52.2 0.62 35.6 0.76 153 0.20 41.6 0.69
σ 1.92 0.01 272 0.06 10.0 0.04 10.11 0.06 78.4 0.13 7.85 0.06 6.50 0.03 123 0.15 3.05 0.04
